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First, although "it is obviously impossible for a president-elect 
of  the United States to measure [exactly] the burden which the 
various tasks of the presidency will impose upon him," it is also 
true that "predictions  of  the  amount of  labor entailed in the 
various  duties,  even  though  they  cannot  be  made  exactly, 
undoubtedly would yield to statistical . . . estimation" (Wallis, 
1936). All three previous articles suggested that Supreme Court 
appointments are one of the potential presidential activities for 
which predictions might  be possible  and useful.  For example, 
Ulmer (1982) argued that no one should have been surprised that 
President Carter made no Supreme Court appointments; indeed, 
according to Ulmer,  Carter  should  have  expected  with  0.13 
probability that he would have had no appointments over his 
four-year  term.  This  estimation  is  important  for  academic 
purposes,  but it  should  also help presidents  make judgments 
about whom  to  appoint.  For example,  suppose  a  president 
wanted to reward one of his top assistants with a Supreme Court 
appointment (Edwin Meese?), but the president also wanted this 
person to work in the White House as long as possible.  If  a 
vacancy  occurs one year  after the inauguration, the relevant 
question that could be answered if these conclusions are correct 
is, "What is the probability that at least one additional vacancy 
will occur in the remaining three years?"' 
Second, the independence and equal probability of occurrence 
conclusions of  previous research leads to the Poisson process as 
an underlying mathematical law that describes Supreme Court 
appointments.  These  findings  may  therefore  demonstrate  in 
yearly appointments "a law and order only dimly in evidence in 
the seeming chaos of" individual Court appointments (Callen and 
Leidecker, 1971: 1188). Their attractiveness thus stems from the 
apparent  applicability  of  a  mathematical  law  of  nature (the 
Poisson  process)  to  this  important  social  science  problem. 
Finding natural laws that apply to the social and political world 
have long been an implicit and sometimes explicit goal of positive 
social science. That a political law appears to  have been found, in 
at least probabilistic form, is very exciting to some. 
The argument of this article is that there are strong substantive King  /  PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO SUPREME COURT  375 
and methodological reasons to be skeptical of  the conclusions 
that Supreme Court appointments are independent and have an 
equal probability of occurrence over all years. Previous authors' 
political  understanding  of  the  frequency  of  Supreme  Court 
appointments rests almost exclusively on these two conclusions. 
By providing evidence that they are invalid, the approach in this 
article suggests a model of  appointments that contrasts sharply 
with previous research. Whereas conventional wisdom describes 
appointments as a special type of  random process, this article 
demonstrates that Supreme Court appointments are functions of 
both random and  systematic factors. In the following sections, I 
describe  the  substantive  reasons  to  distrust  these  previous 
findings,  outline the  statistical misinterpretations that  led  to 
them, provide a reanalysis of the appointments data supporting 
my systematic interpretation, and briefly discuss the findings and 
their theoretical implications. 
POLITICAL SCIENCE MISINTERPRETATIONS 
There are at least three reasons to believe that the expected 
number  of  appointments actually  varies  over  the  years.  The 
second reason also questions the independence assumption. 
First, as noted in all three articles, the number of seats on the 
Court has varied from a low of five, prior to 1807, to a high of ten 
during some of the civil war years.2 It  is implausible to argue that 
the same number of yearly retirements should be expected of  a 
body of six members as one with ten. This is nevertheless what 
previous research assumed. There were some partial tests of this 
hypothesis,  but  a  lack  of  statistical  controls provides  strong 
reasons to question the results. 
Second, if there have recently been a relatively large number of 
retirements, the expected  number  of  current appointments is 
surely less. At the extreme, even if  all the justices  were coin- 
cidentally to retire at once, the conventional wisdom would have 
the probability of an appointment the next year equal to that for 
all other years. This extreme case makes the point, but it is also 376  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY  /  JULY 1987 
plausible  to argue  that  marginal  changes  in  past  retirement 
should  influence  current  retirement.  If  the  argument  in  this 
paragraph is true, then it also contradicts the hypothesis that 
appointments in one year are independent of  appointments in 
succeeding years.3 
Third,  an implied  conclusion  of  the  three  articles  is  that 
exogenous events have no influence on Court vacancies. This may 
be the case at times, but it is unlikely over the long haul. For 
example, it is well known that the Supreme Court has played as 
much of a role in electoral realignments as have other American 
governmental institutions (Adamany, 1980). One way this role 
may get played is through changes in the opinions of the justices; 
another way is through generational replacement of the justices. 
Since individuals do not change their attitudes very often or very 
quickly, it is plausible to argue that replacement probably plays at 
least some role. The specific hypothesis here is that the justices 
have  higher  probabilities  of  retirement  in  times  of  political 
turmoil and realignment. Some justices may intentionally retire 
to make way for youngerjustices with more current attitudes and 
opinions; others may just tire of being at the center of rancorous 
political debate when the Court, and possibly their role on the 
Court, may be subject to increasing criticism. Similarly, after 
controlling for other factors, periods of calm should generally 
reduce the frequency of Supreme Court appointments. 
Thus there are at least three substantive political reasons why 
the two presumptions of past research are implausible. I move 
now to the statistical misinterpretations that seemed to have also 
led to these incorrect conclusions about independence and equal 
probability of  occurrence. 
STATISTICAL MISINTERPRETATIONS 
If Yt denotes the observed number of appointments in year t, 
the assumption of a random Poisson process can be represented 
by this formula (Johnson and Kotz, 1969: chap. 4): King  /  PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO SUPREME COURT  377 
where  Ot  is  the  expected  number  of  appointments  in  year  t, 
E(Yt). For 1837-1932 (Wallis,  l936), for 1837-1970 (Callen and 
Leidecker,  1971), and for  1790-1980 (Ulmer,  1982), there  is 
conclusive evidence that the yearly frequency of Supreme Court 
appointments closely follows the Poisson distribution in Equation 
1. The question is exactly what implications may be validly drawn 
for political science research from this empirical finding. I make 
my point first by analogy. 
Suppose there were a state lottery on Mondays and Thursdays. 
After a while, citizens of  this state began to complain, since it 
appeared that the number 2 came up much more frequently on 
Mondays than Thursdays. Was the lottery fixed? To find out, a 
statistician was hired and asked to determine whether or not the 
results were random. If  the statistician was interested in ascer- 
taining  whether  or  not  the  frequency  of  2s  was  higher  on 
Mondays than Thursdays, two means would be calculated and a 
difference  in means  (or equivalent regression) test  would  be 
performed (King, 1986). Since the data are surely distributed 
Poisson, this additional information (heteroskedasticity  and a 
strongly  skewed  non-Normal  distribution)  would  need  to be 
included in the test. 
This would be the correct way for the statistician to examine 
the fixed lottery hypothesis. But, suppose instead the statistician 
tested the hypothesis that the data were distributed Poisson. In 
this case, he or she would find evidence of a Poisson distribution 
whether or not the lottery wasfixed. The reason has to do with 
Cramer's  (1937) theorem.4 Of  course, this finding has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the lottery being fixed. 
Similarly, the three articles on Supreme Court appointments 
have  demonstrated that  these  data are generated  as  random 
draws  from  a  Poisson  distribution,  but  they  have  neither 
demonstrated nor tested the hypothesis that the probability of  a 
vacancy remains constant over all of American history. As was 
seen in the previous section, there are good reasons to believe 
otherwise. 378  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY  i  JULY 1987 
Such is the motivation for a reanalysis of the Supreme Court 
appointments data: Strong substantive reasons, outlined in the 
previous section, lead to questioning the plausibility of the results 
of  past  research.  Then,  finding  evidence  of  clear  statistical 
misinterpretation in past research suggests an explanation for 
why these scholars came to these apparently incorrect conclu- 
sions. With a more appropriate model applied to these data  in the 
next section, this article conducts the first real test, and presents 
the first contradictory findings, of these hypotheses.5 
AN EXPONENTIAL POISSON REGRESSION MODEL 
OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 
To test these alternative ideas, I have collected  an updated 
version of the same data as has been used before-the  number of 
Supreme  Court  Appointments  per  year,  1790-1984.  But,  in 
addition,  I  have  also  collected  data on  several  explanatory 
variables that fit the three categories of substantive explanation 
above.  In  combination  with  a  model  designed  to  meet  the 
objections of the previous section on statistical misinterpretation, 
these variables will help to point toward a new understanding of 
Court appointments. 
The dependent variable is the number of appointments (YJ per 
year (t = 1790, . . . ,  1984). To measure appointments in previous 
years, I have calculated for each year the number of justices who 
left the Court in the previous six years (PrevApptt).6 The number 
of  seats on the Supreme Court was also recorded for each year 
(NSeatst). 
To get at least some measure of exogenous influences on the 
Court, I use two indicators. Both are measures that correlate with 
realignment and electoral and political turmoil. They are also 
continuous indicators rather than dummy variables with arbitrary 
cutoffs indicating when realigning periods occurred. First, the 
proportional change in the percentage of the population who are 
military personnel on active duty is coded (Military,). Indicators 
of  military  and  international  conflict  have  continually  been King  PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO SUPREME COURT  379 
shown  to  influence  many  political  phenomena  (for example, 
Mueller, 1973). For example, it is likely that the probability of 
retirement from the Court was somewhat higher during the civil 
and world wars. This is not to say that if Americagoes to war then 
all the justices will leave the bench. Instead, military conflict is an 
available,  albeit  imperfect, indicator  of  political,  social,  and 
economic turmoil. Second, "The percent freshman in the House is 
an important variable because it measures the extent of electoral 
change. The higher the percent freshman, the greater the electoral 
change9'(Brady  et al., 1979). Thus I code Fresht as the percentage 
of members of the U.S. House of Representatives who were newly 
elected in the most recent election. I expect increases in both of 
these variables to yield increases in Supreme Court vacancies. 
Since it has been quite clearly established that the dependent 
variable  is  distributed  Poisson,  a  standard  linear  regression 
model is theoretically and statistically inappropriate. Problems 
would  include bias,  inefficiency, inconsistency,  as  well  as the 
wrong functional form. These are technical statistical criteria, but 
in this case they have enormous substantive consequences. For 
these  and  other  event  count  variables-those  measured  as 
nonnegative integers-the  appropriate model is  a form of the 
exponential Poisson regression  (EPR) model (see King, forth- 
coming). This model begins with the assumption that the actual 
number of  appointments in year t follows a Poisson distribution 
(Equation 1) with unobserved mean Ot. The hypothesis that the 
probability appointment in each of then  years is the same as every 
other can then  be  written  as  61 =  62  =  63  =  . . . =  6,.  The 
independence hypothesis suggests that the expected number of 
events in year t, Ot, does not depend on the actual number of 
events in the previous years, PrevApptt. 
To test these assumptions, I do not require Bt to be the same for 
all years, as did previous analyses. Indeed, estimating n of these 6s 
from only n Ys  is surely impossible. To reduce the number of 
parameters to estimate, and to incorporate the hypotheses about 
measured explanations for variations in the unobserved expected 
appointments, Ot, I allow €4  to vary as a function of the explana- 
tory variables mentioned above: 380  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY  /  JULY 1987 
Thus only six parameters need to be estimated, PO,  . . . ,Ps,  an 
easily manageable statistical problem. Several other parts of this 
model also require discussion. First, Et = Yt -  Ot is assumed to be a 
set of independent Poisson random variables.'  This is not to say 
that  the  number  of  appointments  (Yt) are  independent  and 
identically distributed Poisson random variables. In fact, if any of 
the explanatory variables are shown to have an influence on Yt, 
then this prior conventional wisdom will have been incorrect in 
this respect. 
Second, the exponential form of  the relationship implies that 
the  influence  of  the  explanatory variables  on the number  of 
appointments is not constant. It suggests that the "effort3'-in 
terms of  a change in an explanatory variable-needed  to move 
the expected value of Yt from (say) 0 to I is larger than the effort 
needed to move it from (say) 2 to 3. This is a standard assumption 
of EP  regression, appropriate for all models that have an event 
count as a dependent variable. The problem with a linear model in 
this case is that it results in heteroskedasticity and (nonsensical) 
negative predicted numbers of  events. 
Third, both Fresh and Fresh2 are included in this model. This 
(polynomial) specification allows for an increase in the proportion 
of  freshmen  to yield  an increase  in  the  expected  number  of 
vacancies, but it also lets this effect trail off as the proportion of 
freshmen gets very high. Allowing only an "exponential-linear" 
relationship in this case (that is, omitting Fresh2from equation 2), 
could result in unrealistically high predicted values for elections 
with very high turnover or could bias other estimates. 
Fourth,  the  natural logarithm  of  the  number  of  seats, 
In (NSeats),  is included instead of the raw number of seats. This is 
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This is plausible, since it basically weights by the number of 
seats  on  the  Court, using  the  proportion  as  the  dependent 
variable. Algebraically, this equation is identical to Equation 2, 
with PI  constrained to one. As described by King (forthcoming), 
it is harmless to free PI and estimate it as any other parameter. 
Finally, it pays to review the hypotheses in light of this model. 
If any or all of PI,  P2, P3, or P4  and  together are different from 
zero, then the conventional wisdom about the constancy of the 
expected number of Supreme Court appointments over all years 
is incorrect. In addition, if  pz  is different from zero, then the 
previous conclusions about the independence of appointments in 
different years is wrong. Specifically, I hypothesize that more 
seats should yield more appointments (P1>0); previous appoint- 
ments should decrease the frequency of  current appointments 
(PAO); an increase in military conflict should increase retirements 
(P3 >0); and, an increase in the percentage freshman in the House 
should increase (at a decreasing rate) the frequency of appoint- 
ments (P4>0  and Ps  <O).  Although  made plausible from the 
arguments in  previous  sections,  each  of  these  hypotheses  is 
contrary to that implied in previous literature. 
The statistical estimation of equation 2 with the data  described 
above yields the results presented in Table 1. Note first that the 
sign of every coefficient is in the hypothesized direction. Further- 
more, an evaluation of the standard errors indicates relatively 
precise results. From the last column, it appears safe to conclude 
(at conventional significance levels) that all of  the estimates are 
different from zero in the correct direction. The chi-square test at 
the bottom of the Table indicates in summary fashion the strong 
support for the hypotheses in this article. 
Thus previous research is probably incorrect in concluding that 
the frequency of  appointments in any one year is independent of 
succeeding  years.  Specifically,  these  results indicate that four 
more justices being appointed in the previous six years results in 
(-0.2184 X 4  -0.9) nearly one less justice being appointed this 
year, after the effects of the other variables in the equation have 
been taken into ac~ount.~ 
This work also suggests that the three previous articles on this 
subject  were  incorrect  in  arguing  that  the  mean  number  of 382  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY  /  JULY 1987 
TABLE 1 
Exponential Poisson Regression Model of 
US. Supreme Court Appointments 
Table 1: An Exponential Poisson Regression 
Model of  U.S. Supreme Court Appointments  ---  -- 
Standard 
Variable  P  Error  Pr(@  = 0) 
Constant  -  4.3540  2.4770  0.0394 
ln(NSeats)  1.7360  1.0120  0.0431 
Prev  Appb  -0.2184  0.0715  0.0011 
Military  0.4626  0.2253  0.0202 
Fresh  5.9000  4.6450  0.1020* 
Fresh2  -  10.4200  6.5630  0.0562* 
NOTE:  A  test  of  the hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero (that is, have  no 
effect) is  accomplished with a chi-square statistic (x2  =  18.3, 5 degrees of  freedom). 
The  probability  that  these  results  could have  occurred if  all the population  param- 
eters were really zero is 0.0026. 
*The probability that the coefficients on Fresh  and Fresh(2) could have come from 
a population where both are really zero is less than 0.05. 
Supreme Court appointments is constant over time. On the basis 
of  the  variables  in  equation  2,  this  expected  value  varies 
considerably. For example,  an increase  in  electoral  turnover 
increases  Supreme Court retirements.  The coefficients  on the 
variables Fresh and Fresh2 indicate that the effect is smaller as the 
level gets higher.  For example, an increase in the percentage 
freshmen from 0% to 30% will increase the expected number of 
appointments in a year by [0.3 (5.9 -  10.42 X 0) = 1.771 almost two 
more justices, other things being equal. However, if  the level is 
already  at  30%  and  increases  to  60%,  then  the  number  of 
appointments should increase by [0.3 (5.9 - 10.42 X 0.3) = 0.8331 
only slightly less than one justice.9 
Similarly,  national  and  international  military  conflict  (as 
evidenced by  the coefficient  on Military) results in moderate 
increases in Supreme Court appointments. There is also evidence 
that more seats on the high Court lead to more opportunities for 
presidential appointments. King  /  PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO SUPREME COURT  383 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In three articles published over the last five decades, scholars 
have provided interesting and useful descriptions of variations in 
the frequency of presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. That work has conclusively shown that it was a Poisson 
process that gave rise to these observed data. It seemed all that 
was needed was to update these results occasionally. However, 
previous  analysts  ran  into  trouble  when  they  jumped  from 
descriptions to  explanations. All three implied or stated that their 
findings indicated that the expected number of appointments was 
constant  over  time.  They  also  argued  that the  frequency  of 
appointments in one year was independent of succeeding years. 
This article has demonstrated that these  are both spurious 
conclusions. The data are surely Poisson, but that has little to do 
with  these  conclusions:  The  number  of  appointments  is  not 
independent from year to year,  and the expected  number  of 
appointments  is  not  constant  over  time.  Indeed,  there  are 
interesting systematic relationships in these data that have been 
missed until now. Supreme Court appointments can be forecast 
far  better if viewed as resulting from a set of explanatory variables 
than by assuming that they are merely random events. Evidence 
was provided here that more seats on the Court led to more 
appointments on average. Also, more appointments are expected 
in the current period when there have not been many in recent 
years. Finally, the  justices do tend to respond to  political change; 
when there is more political volatility and military conflict, there 
is a greater likelihood of Court retirements. 
Previous scholars were impressed with the possibility that a 
mathematical model could explain political phenomena such as 
this. This is a useful statistical finding, but to describe a political 
process as an essentially random event-even  though it is a very 
special type of randomness-can  only add limited information to 
political explanation.10 Political scientists are usually interested 
in explaining systematic variations in the expected value of  some 
dependent variable (the expected number of appointments in this 
case). That is what is usually meant by "the model" in statistical 384  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY  /  JULY 1987 
research and much formal modeling. In this case, very different 
substantive implications result from a proper interpretation of 
mathematical and statistical evidence. Previous research correctly 
described the process generating the randomness; this article went 
a  step  further  by  identifying  the  systematic explanations for 
Court vacancies. Instead of describing Supreme Court appoint- 
ments  as  a  random process,  we  can now  explain them  as  a 
combination  of  random and systematic factors.  Paying more 
attention to these systematic factors allows us to understand more 
fully and better forecast this important political phenomenon. 
Further  research  of  a  more  detailed  nature could  help  to 
answer  a  variety  of  other  hypotheses  about  Supreme  Court 
appointments. Data on the individual justices  in the Supreme 
Court could help to answer questions about the effect of health on 
retirement. A more politically relevant hypothesis is whether or 
not older justices wait to retire until a president of their political 
party identification  or ideological orientation is  in  the White 
House. Since other decisions of the justices are based on political 
orientations, it is plausible that retirement decisions, when they 
are voluntary, also depend upon political calculation.1l 
More generally, the influence of random chance and environ- 
mental factors on the success and power of  presidents  is well 
respected in the presidency literature (Heclo and Salmon, 1981). 
Presidents may have varying degrees of personal power (Neustadt, 
1980),  but  individual  presidential  behaviors  are  powerfully 
affected  by  their  environments.  Congressional,  rather  than 
presidential, elections may well explain influence in Congress; 
events exogenous to the United States may explain the state of the 
American economy more than presidential policy; even public 
approval of presidents seems to be more a function of time and 
exogenous events than of  direct presidential intervention. This 
situation demands that presidency scholars put more effort into 
forecasting or at least explaining the political events that make up 
a president's environment. King : PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO  SUPREME COURT  385 
NOTES 
1. Nearly  a third (30.2%) of  all justices  served as presidential  appointees in the 
executive branch before being appointed to the Court. More than half  of  these held 
cabinet-level positions. 
2.  The Judiciary Act of  1801 set the size of the court at five members, but it was 
repealed by Congress before any of the six justices left the Court. 
3.  This is related to an age hypothesis. However, preliminary analyses indicated that 
the age  of  the oldest justice  had negligible effects on expected vacancies.  Deriving a 
measure of health would be more to the point, but it seems infeasible. One possibility 
would be to use the number of years from the justices'  death, either when that death is 
observed  or demographically  expected. The former is deficient on theoretical grounds; 
using a variable at time t to explain one at time t - 1 is  always problematic but is 
particularly so here because of the large amount of noise in the variable. The latter fails 
because  information such as health conditions  and demographic information on this 
specialized a group of citizens is unavailable. 
4.  Cramer's  technical  point  was  that the  sum of  independent  Poisson  random 
variables is also distributed as a Poisson variable (with its mean equal to the sum of the 
means of the individual Poisson variables). 
5.  As hinted at above, Ulmer (1982:  115) is most sensitive to, and does provide 
preliminary tests of, the "number  of  seats" hypothesis. However, the lack of statistical 
controls make his results difficult to interpret. 
6.  The choice of six years is somewhat arbitrary. One year is clearly insufficient and 
ten is probably too  long. This choice was the result of experimentation with several values 
in between, as well as with a variety of other more complicated lag structures. 
7.  Actually, each et is independently distributed as [Poisson (Bt) -&I, where E(Y:) = 6. 
Thus E(et) = 0, for all t. 
8. Since we are probably most interested inthe  typicalcase where about one Supreme 
Court appointment is expected, these coefficients can be interpreted roughly as regression 
coefficients. The reason is that when an independent variable in an  EP  regression increases 
by one unit, the expected value of the dependent variable will increase by the respective 
regression coefficient multiplied by the previous expected value of the dependent  variable: 
Ot&  Since the average of Y, is about 1,O:P can be interpreted for  the typical  year as P would 
be in a regression equation. In  years when the expected number of appointments is higher, 
the effect is also higher. See King (forthcoming) for details. 
9.  This is the standard interpretation of a parabola. The effect of Fresh on Yt is (5.9 - 
10.42 Fresh). This term is then multiplied by the amount Fresh is increased (0.3 in the 
examples in the text). 
10.  In fact, the first article in this series (Wallis, 1936) is regularly cited in the statistical 
literature as evidence that the Poisson distribution arises in natural situations (Haight, 
1967: 105). This may be of some interest to statisticians and politicalmethodologists, but it 
is not a point that should be of primary interest to political scientists. 
11. There is no omitted variable bias in estimating equation 2, since the variables 
described in this paragraph are plausibly not correlated with the included variables. 386  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY  /  JULY 1987 
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